The theory of flow argues that subjective well-being results from absorption in an activity that strikes a good balance between challenges and skills. This absorption has been termed flow. Such absorption is often reported in combat situations, in which it contributes both to the subjective well-being and to the efficiency of soldiers. This article suggests that combat flow may have been central to military training and military performance throughout history. The study of combat flow could therefore shed new light on military history and form the basis for the development of new training techniques. The article simultaneously probes the ethical and political implications of manipulating the subjective well-being of soldiers in such a way. It cautions scholars of flow and subjective well-being that they should be aware of the ethical and political implications of their studies and warns against the dangerous political results of equating subjective well-being with happiness. The article further calls for greater cooperation between psychologists and historians in the study of well-being.
The theory of flow-one of the leading theories of the burgeoning science of well-beingargues that subjective well-being results from absorption in an activity that strikes a good balance between challenges and skills. When people are absorbed in such an activity, they experience what M. Csikszentmihalyi ( , 1991 Csikszentmihalyi ( , 1997 has termed flow.
In flow, "experience seamlessly unfolds from moment to moment" (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 90) ; one is fully concentrated on the present moment; goals are immediate and clear; action and awareness merge; reflective self-consciousness is lost (one loses "awareness of oneself as a social actor"; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 90) ; "irrelevant thoughts, worries, distractions no longer have a chance to appear in consciousness" (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988c, p. 34) ; and the sense of time is distorted. In such states, individuals "operate at full capacity" (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 90) ; maximizing their efficiency, creativity, and sense of well-being (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, pp. 90 -92; Csikszentmihalyi, 1988c, pp. 32-34 ; see also Csikszentmihalyi, 1988b Csikszentmihalyi, , 1991 Csikszentmihalyi, , 1997 .
M. Csikszentmihalyi (1997, pp. 98 -99) illustrated the experience of flow by using the example of skiing:
You are skiing down a slope and your full attention is focused on the movements of the body, the position of the skis, the air whistling past your face, and the snow-shrouded trees running by. There is no room in your awareness for conflicts or contradictions; you know that a distracting thought or emotion might get you buried facedown in the snow. And who wants to get distracted? The run is so perfect that all you want is for it to last forever, to immerse yourself completely in the experience.
In interview after interview, when asked about such experiences, people say things such as "you are in an ecstatic state to such a point that you feel as though you almost don't exist" (from an interview with a composer) or "You lose your sense of time, you're completely enraptured, you are completely caught up in what you're doing [you are] so saturated with it that there's no future or past, it's just an extended present" (from an interview with a lyricist; M. Csikszentmihalyi, 1999, p. 825) .
Remarkably similar flow experiences have been reported across a very wide range of activities, including sports, artistic creation, scien-tific study, medical surgery, menial work, and leisure activities (Allison & Duncan, 1988; Berger & Schreyer, 1986; Demerouti, 2006; Emerson, 1998; Finneran & Zhang, 2003; Harmison, 2006; Jackson & Csikszentmihalyi, 1999; Larson, 1988; LeFevre, 1988; Marotto, Roos, & Victor, 2007; Pace, 2004; Whalen, 1999) . Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi (2002, p. 90) emphasized that "the experience is the same across lines of culture, class, gender, and age, as well as across kinds of activity." (For the universality of flow experiences across cultures, see also M. Csikszentmihalyi, 1988a, p. 29; 1988c; Inghilleri, 1999; Massimini, Csikszentmihalyi, & Delle Fave, 1988) .
The alleged universality of the flow experience has led I. Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi (1988a, pp. 191-192) to argue that in flow theory, "History gains a powerful tool for understanding" and that "the course of biocultural evolution cannot be understood without it." However, with the exception of Isabella own study of flow in the early modern Jesuit Order, historians seem to be oblivious of this theory, or at least reluctant to make use of it.
Another potential area of research that has so far been untouched by flow theory is the military sphere. Although the experience of combat has been in the limelight of academic scholarship for at least 3 decades (for recent scholarship on the experience of combat, see Black, 2004; Bourke, 1999; Harari, 2007 Harari, , 2008 Keegan, 1976; Lee, 2007) and although there are some pioneering studies of subjective wellbeing in the military (Griffith, 2002; Limbert, 2004) , so far no research has been done on flow in war, and particularly in combat.
This article is an initial attempt to address both lacunae and to examine flow in the context of military history. It argues that flow theory may provide military history with a powerful tool for understanding military experiences, whereas military history in return may not only provide flow theory with historical depth, but also with greater political and ethical sensibilities. As the article explores virgin research territory, I seek to highlight potential lines of research rather than to reach definitive conclusions.
Combat Flow
In their accounts of combat, veterans of 20th-century wars have often described positive combat experiences in terms that bear striking resemblance to the above definition of flow. For example, the combat experience of Shawn Nelson, an American soldier, in Mogadishu in 1993 was described in the following terms:
It was hard to describe how he felt . . . it was like an epiphany. Close to death, he had never felt so completely alive. . . . The only thing he could compare it to was the feeling he found sometimes when he surfed, when he was inside the tube of a big wave and everything around him was energy and motion and he was being carried along by some terrific force and all he could do was focus intently on holding his balance, riding it out. Surfers called it The Green Room. Combat was another door to that room. A state of complete mental and physical awareness. In those hours on the street he had not been Shawn Nelson, he had no connection to the larger world, no bills to pay, no emotional ties, nothing. He had just been a human being staying alive from one nano-second to the next, drawing one breath after another, fully aware that each one might be his last. He felt he would never be the same. (Bowden, 2001, pp. 301-302) The basic positive characteristic of combat, according to Bowden, is that one's entire awareness is absorbed in the present moment ("He had just been a human being staying alive from one nano-second to the next, drawing one breath after another"). This is closely connected to several other characteristics: (a) One loses reflective awareness as a social actor, and all irrelevant worries and thoughts are excluded ("He had not been Shawn Nelson, he had no connection to the larger world, no bills to pay'); (b) as one loses awareness of past and future and becomes fully concentrated on the present moment, the normal sense of time is distorted (another veteran explained that the best thing about war is that in war, "we have only the present"; Ben-Yehuda, 1981, pp. 358 -359) ; and (c) the complete awareness of the present to the exclusion of all else results in an exhilarating and heightened sense of being alive ("He had never felt so completely alive" and "a state of complete mental and physical awareness").
Other veterans have emphasized how absorption in the present increases efficiency and enables individuals to maximize their abilities. Philip Caputo (1977) (pp. 265-266) Thanks to this perfect clarity of mind, which was coupled with emotional exhilaration and a complete disregard of the physical difficulties and dangers, Caputo led his platoon to victory. The experience was one of the most pleasant moments of his life.
I felt a drunken elation. . . . I had never experienced anything like it before. When the line wheeled and charged across the clearing, the enemy bullets whining past them, wheeled and charged almost with drill-field precision, an ache as profound as the ache of orgasm passed through me. (p. 268) Caputo reflected that perhaps it is to experience such a perfect moment that "some officers make careers of the infantry, why they endure the petty regulations, the discomforts and degradations, the dull years of peacetime duty in dreary posts" (p. 268). (Cf. the discussion of flow and collective action in an orchestra in Marotto et al., 2007) .
Caputo further wrote that after he himself left Vietnam and the Army, Within a year I began growing nostalgic for the war. . . . I could protest [against the war] as loudly as the most convinced activist, but I could not deny the grip the war had on me, nor the fact that it had been an experience as fascinating as it was repulsive, as exhilarating as it was sad. . . . Anyone who fought in Vietnam, if he is honest about himself, will have to admit he enjoyed the compelling attractiveness of combat. (pp. xiv-xv) What was so attractive about war? Caputo returned to the experience of combat flow, explaining that under fire, a man's powers of life heightened in proportion to the proximity of death. His senses quickened, he attained an acuity of consciousness at once pleasurable and excruciating. It was something like the elevated state of awareness induced by drugs. And it could be just as addictive, for it made whatever else life offered in the way of delights or torments seem pedestrian. (p. xv)
Caputo became a war correspondent. In My War Gone By, I Miss It So, the British war photographer Anthony Loyd (1999) described a similar process of becoming addicted to the experience of combat flow, which propelled him to go first to Bosnia and then to Chechnya.
To summarize, combat flow can be defined as a situation during combat when (a) soldiers are fully absorbed in the present moment; (b) they lose reflective awareness as social actors, along with all irrelevant worries and thoughts; (c) their normal sense of time is distorted; (d) they experience an exhilarating and heightened sense of "being alive"; and (e) as a result of the above, they can maximize their mental and physical abilities.
Combat may well be particularly conducive to flow because in combat the necessity of focusing on the present moment is a matter of life and death, far more so than while writing lyrics, conducting an orchestra, or skiing. Concurrently, combat flow seems to provide an unparalleled confirmation of flow theory: Even an experience involving extreme levels of deprivation, discomfort, and danger turns out to become highly attractive once people "enter" flow (see also Shmotkin, 2005) .
Combat flow has been familiar since long before the 1970s. Military memoirs from throughout the 20th century contain numerous descriptions similar to the above examples. In particular, Fascist writers of the 1920s and 1930s often described experiences of combat flow, arguing not only that they were pleasurable in themselves, but that they were positive turning points in their lives with long-lasting influences. Militaristic propaganda that glorified war and argued that it is an essential requirement for building strong men and a strong nation made much of the ecstatic nature of combat. In Der Kampf als inneres Erlebnis ("Battle as an Inner Experience"), Ernst Jünger (1922) described combat in the following terms:
Once again: the ecstasy. The condition of the holy man, of great poets and of great love is also granted to those of great courage. The enthusiasm of manliness bursts beyond itself to such an extent that the blood boils as it surges through the veins and glows as it foams through the heart . . . it is an intoxication beyond all intoxication, an unleashing that breaks all bonds. [In combat] the individual is like a raging storm, the tossing sea and the roaring thunder. He has melted into everything. (Herf, 1984, p. 74 ; see also Jünger, 1996; Meyer, 1993; Nevin, 1996; Schwarz, 1975) Rudolf Höss (1992) , the notorious Kommandant of Auschwitz, described in his memoirs how in his first battle in the First World War , he was at first terrified and frozen, unable to fire his weapon. Then "suddenly, a strange, rigid calm came over me that I had never known before" (pp. 55-56). He entered a sort of trance. All his training came back to him, and he began shooting rapidly and accurately at the approaching enemy soldiers, without thinking about the danger he was in. He became so absorbed in his actions that afterward he could not even remember whether he wounded or killed any enemy soldiers, except for his first kill, which etched itself in his mind. From that day, Höss became an excellent soldier. In his memoirs, he explained that his newfound mental ability to face death and danger while focusing on the task at hand stood him in good stead later on, both during the First World War and during his career in the SS and the concentration camps.
Combat flow was well known in the 19th century, too. In War and Peace (1865-1868), Leo Tolstoy (1957) transported his personal experiences from the Crimean War to the great struggle of the Napoleonic Wars, trying to capture the universal realities of war. War and Peace contains numerous descriptions of combat flow. The following quote describes the experience of the imaginary figure Captain Tushin, commander of an artillery battery, at the battle of Schön Graben (1805). It is particularly interesting because Tolstoy himself saw combat as an artillery officer and because this description links absorption in the moment, ecstatic joy, and increased military efficiency:
Owing to the terrible din and uproar, and the necessity for concentration and diligence, Tushin did not experience the slightest qualm of fear, and the idea that he might be killed or badly wounded never entered his head. On the contrary, he grew more and more elated. . . . Though he forgot nothing, thought of everything, did everything the best of officers could have done in his position, he was in a state akin to feverish delirium or intoxication.
The deafening roars of his guns on every side, the whistle and thud of the enemy's cannon-balls, the sight of the flushed, perspiring faces of the crews bustling round the guns, the sight of the blood of men and horses, of the little puffs of smoke on the enemy's side (always followed by a ball flying over to hit the earth, a man, a cannon or a horse)-all these sights and sounds formed into a fantastic world which took possession of his brain and at this moment afforded him sheer delight. (Vol. 1, Captain Elzéar Blaze, who saw service in the Napoleonic Wars, wrote in 1837 that "when you maneuver, when you fire, when you are fully engaged, your feelings disappear-the smoke, the uproar of the cannon, the shouts of the combatants intoxicate everyone. You don't have time to think of yourself' (Blaze, 1837 (Blaze, / 1995 . Lieutenant John Shipp, who fought in India in the early 19th century, wrote in 1829 concerning combat that in action man is quite another being: the softer feelings of the roused heart are absorbed in the vortex of danger, and the necessity for self-preservation, and give place to others more adapted to the occasion. In these moments there is an indescribable elation of spirits; the soul rises above its wonted serenity into a kind of frenzied apathy to the scene before you-a heroism bordering on ferocity. (Shipp, 1890, pp. 106 -107) Such sentiments have caused William Martin-a British veteran of the siege of Sebastopol (1854 -1855)-to conclude that although the soldiers suffered from terrible privations in their trenches and although half his tentmates were either killed or wounded during the siege, I do not think there was any time of my life that I enjoyed more than that at the Siege of Sebastopol. It was good weather, and though those who went into the trenches never all came back, this did not cast any shade of gloom on our lives; but, on the contrary, the danger we daily and hourly encountered gave a zest to life that nothing else can give. (Martin, 1915, p. 122 ; for more examples, see Harari, 2008) For reasons that are discussed below, descriptions of combat flow were much rarer before 1750. Yet combat flow may well have had a significant role in pre-1750 wars, too. For example, it may have been central to the early modern development of military training techniques. Beginning in the early 17th-century Dutch army, the training of soldiers focused primarily on mechanical drill. All the different movements soldiers were supposed to perform on the battlefield-walking, standing, loading, and firing-were broken down into series of dozens of precise movements. For example, the loading and firing of a musket was broken down into 42 distinct movements. Drill consisted of teaching the soldiers these movements separately, then combining them together and repeating them countless times on the parade ground, until the sequence of movements was performed automatically (de Gheyn, 1608; Hexham, 1637) . During combat, soldiers were expected to perform this sequence of movements one more time, absorbing their attention in the sequence and completely disregarding the danger surrounding them. It has been customary to criticize drill as an unrealistic and stifling train-ing method. Yet it is possible that by training the attention of soldiers, drill helped them enter combat flow and perform better during combat. This may explain why despite its drawbacks, drill dominated European training methods for more than 2 centuries and why it still holds an important place in present-day military culture and military training programs (McNeil, 1995;  see also Houlding, 1981, pp. 153-287; Parker, 1996, pp. 20 -23; Van Creveld, 1989, pp. 92-95) .
Many other training and fighting methods in history may have owed something to combat flow. One possible example is the berserks: warriors in many different cultures and eras (from ancient Mesopotamia to medieval Scandinavia) who entered combat in a state of trance, fighting with superhuman power and complete disregard of danger (Speidel, 2002) . Another example is Japanese warriors through the Second World War who were occasionally given training in Zen Buddhist meditation techniques (King, 1993; Victoria, 1997 Victoria, , 2003 . More generally, combat flow may help explain the joy of combat evinced in almost every warrior culture from Homeric Greece to medieval Europe.
Much of this is speculative. Whether combat flow really had much do to with early modern drill or medieval berserks is something that only a far more detailed study could corroborate (or deny). Yet flow theory may offer a new and more scientific method of studying the history of military training and combat experience, emphasizing that armies and warrior cultures throughout history have sought to train the attention of soldiers at least as much as their menial dexterity or intelligence. It is no coincidence that the most common word of command in modern armies, which usually precedes every other command, is attention.
Flow theory may also be used to devise new training methods for tomorrow's armies, which would focus on the training of attention and on helping soldiers and commanders enter combat flow. Such methods would at one stroke increase both the soldiers' efficiency and their well-being. Increasing the soldiers' well-being may in turn raise their morale. Armies are uniquely positioned to devise and implement a radical program of attention training thanks to their complete control of almost every aspect of the lives of their personnel. (It is notable that the Swedish police have already attempted to restructure police work along lines more conducive to flow; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 99) .
Given current advances in biotechnology and given that flow seems to have a physiological basis, it may even be feasible to manufacture a flow-inducing drug (cf. Nesse, 2005, p. 27) . Because flow increases both subjective wellbeing and efficiency, dealing such a drug to soldiers in combat would be a win-win choice for armies, which have tended throughout history to drug their soldiers even with efficiencyreducing drugs such as alcohol (Kopperman, 1996) .
Ethical and Political Implications
The previous discussion has probably raised uncomfortable feelings and ethical qualms among some readers. Realizing that flow can be generated by killing people sheds a sinister light on flow theory. Harnessing flow theory for military aims, following the lead of Fascist thinkers and draconian drill masters, is something present-day scholars may be even less happy to endorse. After the Second World War, Zen Buddhist monks in Japan were criticized for the way they put their meditative skills at the service of the militaristic state (Victoria, 1997 (Victoria, , 2003 . Flow theoreticians had better learn from this precedent. (For the ethical questions raised by flow theory, see also I. Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988a, p. 186; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 101.) It is notable that even many soldiers, although reporting combat flow as an incredible high, reflect on its underside. Philip Caputo (1977) , after describing his combat flow as an orgasmic experience, reflected back with irony that "I was John Wayne in Sands of Iwo Jima. I was Aldo Ray in Battle Cry. No, I was a young, somewhat immature officer flying on an overdose of adrenalin" (p. 269). Significantly, Caputo later described how he and his platoon brutalized civilians and wantonly destroyed a Vietnamese village, swept away by another trancelike experience of flow (p. 304).
The ethical and political dilemmas combat flow raises are inherent in the theory of flow and in the methodology of the science of well-being in general. The way we define and measure well-being has far-reaching ethical and political consequences. Studies of flow use different methods to define and measure well-being, such as distributing questionnaires to large number of interviewees, interactive interviews, the experience sampling model that asks informants to report their feelings at random moments in everyday life (I. Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi, 1988b; M. Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Diener, Lucas, & Oishi, 2002; Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002; Sandvik, Diener, & Seidlitz, 1993) , and monitoring physiological data such as the movement of facial muscles, electrophysiological brain activity, and electrodermal activity (Bradley, 2000; Davidson, 2005; Dawson, Schell, & Filion, 2000; Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; Tassinary & Cacioppo, 2000) .
What unites all these methods is that ultimately, they define and measure well-being according to statistical surveys of the subjective evaluations people pass on their own experiences. Diener and Seligman (2004, p . 1) defined well-being in an authoritative review as "people's positive evaluations of their lives." Even the monitoring of physiological data boils down to such "statistical subjectivity." We can use the latest technology to monitor electrophysiological patterns, but we still need statistics on people's subjective evaluations to label these patterns well-being or ill-being. Scientists are not in a position to say to people, "You may be feeling miserable, but on the basis of this physiological data, we tell you that you are in fact happy," or vice versa (Davidson, 2005) . At most they can tell people, "You report feeling miserable, but we can tell you that most people who display similar electrophysiological patterns report feeling happy."
The adoption of statistical subjectivity as a measure for well-being is anything but selfevident. It goes against the grain of numerous past and present traditions, which have argued that humans' biggest problem is their ignorance. Because of ignorance, people confuse some secondary good such as sensual pleasure with the summum bonum of real happiness and consequently harm themselves (McInerny, 2006; McMahon, 2006, pp. 55-56) .
For instance, in medieval and early modern European culture, the subjective feelings of individual people were considered unreliable sources for evaluating the human condition. It was common to think that people were completely ignorant of the true nature of reality and consequently ignorant of their own wellbeing as well. People are likely to feel good in situations that are in fact self-destructive and decidedly undesirable. The Catholic Church, and all but the most radical Protestant sect leaders, reserved for themselves the right to tell people, "You may be feeling happy, but in fact you are wallowing in misery." From a Christian viewpoint, the sinner who enjoys sensual pleasure and who reports feeling very happy with it is not happy at all-he is simply deluded.
According to Buddhism, too, most people have never experienced true happiness, and because of their ignorance, they not only prefer lower goods to the summum bonum, but they mistake misery for happiness, and actively pursue misery and cling to it with all their power. Whereas true happiness consists of realizing the impermanent nature of all phenomena and refraining from clinging to them, humans all too often try to attain happiness by clinging to pleasant phenomena (such as flow). This is what keeps humans rolling in Samsara. It is notable that some Buddhist teachers have warned that merely getting absorbed in the presentthrough meditation or any other meanswithout realizing impermanence may be very pleasant for a while, but it cannot liberate people from suffering, and it may even lead them astray into immoral and self-destructive practices (Hart, 1987, pp. 76 -80) . From a Buddhist perspective, defining well-being by distributing questionnaires to thousands of people may produce reliable results only if all the people participating in the survey have already attained enlightenment and are accordingly in a position to judge what true happiness is. Otherwise, the survey will indicate only the most widespread illusions.
The idea that well-being can be defined and measured by statistical surveys of subjective feelings is in fact quite new-a product of 18th-century developments. The 18th century witnessed the rise and triumph of the Culture of Sensibility (one of the main currents of the Enlightenment). The Culture of Sensibility attacked all previous authorities on the human condition, and in particular religious dogma, rational speculation, and social approval. Instead, it declared subjective feelings to be the ultimate judges of the human condition and a prime locus for new ethical, political, and aesthetical authority (Barker-Benfield, 1992; Bell, 2000; Ellison, 1999; C. Jones, 1993; O'Neal, 1996; Taylor, 1989; Vila, 1998) .
This novel approach was summed up by Rousseau (1762 Rousseau ( /1967 in his É mile, the new sentimental Bible, where one of his mouthpieces says, "What I feel to be good is good, what I feel to be bad is bad." Rousseau explained that although all our ideas come from without, the feelings by which they are weighed are within us, and it is by these feelings alone that we perceive fitness or unfitness of things in relation to ourselves, which leads us to seek or shun these things. To exist is to feel, our feeling is undoubtedly earlier than our intelligence, and we had feelings before we had ideas. Whatever may be the cause of our being, it has provided for our preservation by giving us feelings suited to our nature. (pp. 353-354) Rousseau anticipated here the argument of today's sociobiologists and evolutionary psychologists (although unlike them, he trusted nature's benevolence). It is the rise and spread of this new Culture of Sensibility that is responsible for the otherwise curious phenomenon noted earlier: the near absence of pre-1750 descriptions of combat flow. In a survey of about 150 military memoirs from the period 1450 -1750, hardly any descriptions of combat flow were found (Harari, 2007 (Harari, , 2008 . Significantly, these texts contain very few descriptions of any subjective combat experiences and focus instead on objective events. In contrast, from around 1750 onward, descriptions of combat flow (and of other subjective combat experiences) became increasingly common in military memoirs. Several explanations can be offered for this, yet it seems likely that once general culture began to invest more authority in subjective feelings, soldiers had far greater incentive to report their subjective combat experiencesincluding combat flow-and to base their evaluation of war on these experiences (Harari, 2008) .
The rising importance of subjective feelings culminated in Utilitarianism. Utilitarians made two interconnected arguments: First, happiness is the ultimate good, and "the greatest happiness of the greatest number" is accordingly the basic criterion to evaluate all political, social, and economic phenomena. Second, happiness itself is defined and judged by people's own subjective feelings (McMahon, 2006, pp. 197-252; Scarre, 1996) . Utilitarians rejected the possibility that the majority of humans, or entire civilizations, may be trapped in ignorance and mesmerized by illusionary definitions of happiness. From the Utilitarian perspective, the fact that a majority of people feel good in a particular situation (e.g., in flow) means ipso facto that it is conducive to happiness.
As Diener, Lucas, and Oishi (2002, p. 63 ) explained, "The Utilitarians were the intellectual forerunners of subjective well-being researchers" (see also M. Csikszentmihalyi, 1999, p. 821; Kahneman & Riis, 2005, pp. 289 -290) . By adopting the Utilitarian approach, the science of well-being has managed to extricate itself from the quagmire of millennia of philosophical and religious discussions about the meaning of happiness, climbing onto the apparently firmer plains of statistical data. Yet the question of combat flow exposes the huge price tag attached to this extraction. By basing wellbeing on statistical surveys of subjective feelings, we lose our ability to question the authority of these feelings from an ethical or political viewpoint. We become particularly helpless in the face of social, political, and military systems that are sophisticated and powerful enough to manipulate people's subjective feelings of wellbeing.
Combat flow exposes the ethical and political risks involved in the subjective definition of well-being with particular acuteness because the well-being of soldiers in war is today an important political question (unlike the wellbeing of athletes). As a result of the Culture of Sensibility and of dramatic changes in the political and social infrastructure of war, since around 1776 -1789 it has become increasingly common to evaluate military enterprises according to the soldiers' well-being and to evaluate their well-being by means of their own subjective feelings. Ethical judgments of war in general, political movements for and against particular wars, and most of late modern war art have all come to draw their inspiration and authority from the subjective experiences of soldiers (Harari, 2008) .
Even victory-the ultimate good of military theory-has increasingly been judged by the yardstick of soldiers' subjective feelings. For instance, the unprecedented attention that the British press and public gave to the sufferings of the common soldiers during the Crimean War (1853-1856) has caused this ultimately victorious campaign to be evaluated and remembered in Britain as a decidedly "bad" war (Ponting, 2004) . Mainstream thinking in France and Britain about the First World War has judged this war to be an even worse catastrophe. The great victory eventually won over Germany-one of the most decisive victories in history in purely military and political terms-is commonly thought to be outweighed by the amount of subjective suffering experienced by the troops (Fussell, 1975; Sheffield, 2002) . In the United States during the Vietnam War and in Israel during the Lebanon War, reports of soldiers' subjective ill-being probably outweighed purely military considerations in sapping public support for the war. The question of the soldiers' subjective well-being is central today to the debate about the war in Iraq, and for every bird's-eye analysis of the strategic situation in Iraq, the media presents at least one worm's-eye narrative of the common soldiers' subjective experiences. Although the subjective well-being of enemy soldiers and civilians also receives increasing attention, it is far less important. The suffering of a single U.S. soldier has far more weight in the American public sphere than the suffering of thousands of Iraqi civilians (Carruthers, 2000; Hoskins, 2004; Katovsky & Carlson, 2003; Tumber & Palmer, 2004) .
The subjective well-or ill-being of soldiers has consequently become as important as strategic and geopolitical factors in the conduct of wars, and Western armies spend increasing amounts of money and energy to ensure (or manipulate) the subjective well-being of their troops (Harari, 2008) . The huge investment in military psychiatry and military psychology is just one result of this trend (Shephard, 2001) .
This seemingly positive development has a problematic message for the study of combat flow. If wars are judged to a large extent on the basis of soldiers' well-being, and if well-being is evaluated by means of the soldiers' own subjective feelings, manipulating the soldiers' subjective well-being turns out to be a decidedly political enterprise with dubious potentials. It would be dangerously easy to justify any war waged by an army of happy soldiers high on combat flow. There is of course nothing inherently wrong in making soldiers feel better, but anyone undertaking such a task should simultaneously take care to clarify that the subjective feelings of soldiers are not necessarily an indication of true happiness and are certainly not a vindication of politics (for a similar debate regarding the treatment of posttraumatic stress disorder in soldiers, see Shephard, 2001 ).
Conclusions
In a culture that at least since 1776 has accorded subjective well-being (and the pursuit of happiness) far-reaching political authority, any study that may facilitate the manipulation of subjective well-being had better be aware of its own ethical and political implications. Given these implications, flow theory and the science of well-being in general may profit in particular from questioning whether statistical surveys of subjective feelings are a good indication of true happiness.
At least some late modern scholars and scientists have been far less sanguine about adopting the Utililtarian legacy. Neo-Marxists and feminist scholars are often wary of the authority given to the subjective experiences of workers and women, arguing that this may all too often reflect "false consciousness" and the manipulation of the capitalist and patriarchal systems. Neo-Marxist thought currently takes it for granted that subjective experience is an unreliable authority (Ireland, 2002) . From a NeoMarxist perspective, scientists who help oppressed workers to experience flow at work, without improving their socioeconomic and political conditions, are just dealing opium to the masses.
Sociobiology and evolutionary psychology consider subjective feelings to be ingenious mechanisms developed by evolution for the sole purpose of propagating genes. Acting according to our subjective feelings may bring us genetic proliferation, but not happiness. The bitter biological truth is that natural selection "doesn't 'want' us to be happy. It 'wants' us to be genetically prolific" (Wright, 1994, p. 211) , and consequently "we are built to be effective animals, not happy ones" (Wright, 1994, p. 298 ; see also Dawkins, 1990; Nesse, 2005, pp. 10, 23-24; McMahon, 2006, pp. 422-423; Wright, 1994, pp. 272-273, 327-329) . From this sociobiological perspective, statistics of subjective feelings are a good indication of the ways in which our genes try to manipulate us and spread themselves, rather than an indication for what makes us really happy.
Adopting a Neo-Marxist or sociobiological approach-or a traditional Christian or Buddhist approach-need not undermine the importance of flow theory nor impede the scientific study of flow. It would merely force us to think harder about the relation between subjective well-being and happiness. From a Christian, Buddhist, Marxist, or sociobiological perspective, subjective feelings are just the leash with which Satan, Samsara, the capitalist system, or the selfish gene holds humans. Scholars who would adopt any of these approaches may still study flow scientifically and may still rely on empirical data to verify what people feel. Yet they will probably understand this study and interpret its findings in strikingly different terms. By studying flow, we are not necessarily discovering some infallible recipe for happiness. Instead, we may be getting a few steps closer to understanding how people have deluded themselves throughout history and how the selfish gene, the capitalist system, Satan, or Samsara entraps human beings in its net.
